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Administrative Law:  
Whose Job Is It Anyway? 
Abstract 
 
This Note examines the current state of judicial deference to ad-
ministrative agencies and suggests modifying the doctrine to better 
comport with the Constitution.  It examines the history of adminis-
trative agencies and the rise of judicial deference.  The Note ex-
plores the present-day applications of judicial deference and ana-
lyzes whether the current doctrine is consistent with both its initial 
underlying policies and the Constitution.  Ultimately, judicial defer-
ence to administrative agencies raises serious separation of powers 
concerns and should be modified to remain faithful to the nation’s 
founding principles. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With six-in-ten Americans saying that the fundamental design and struc-
ture of the United States government requires significant changes to better 
serve the country for current times,1 government, politics, and the rule of law 
have grown in both prevalence and complexity.2  To address the ever-expand-
ing demands of a fast-paced and progressive society, the United States gov-
ernment developed what has come to be known as the “administrative state,” 
which is full of complicated agencies, rules, and regulations created to tackle 
the many facets of the country’s needs.3  As of 2019, there were 449 adminis-
trative agencies in the United States promulgating regulations to execute the 
laws of the Legislative and Executive Branches.4  Amidst the vast number of 
governmental task forces, several scholars and politicians have begun to ques-
tion whether the interactions between the government and its “fourth branch” 
have strayed too far from the framework set forth in the Constitution.5 
During the 2018 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for Justice Ka-
vanaugh’s confirmation, Senator Ben Sasse opened his remarks with a School-
house Rock civics lesson:  
 Number one: In our system, the legislative branch is supposed to 
be the center of our politics.   
 
 1. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PUBLIC, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 11–
12 (April 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/04/26/the-public-the-political-system-and-ameri-
can-democracy/ [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PUBLIC]. 
 2. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., SINCE TRUMP’S ELECTION, INCREASED ATTENTION TO POLITICS—
ESPECIALLY AMONG WOMEN 1 (July 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/07/20/since-trumps-
election-increased-attention-to-politics-especially-among-women/ (explaining that “52% of Ameri-
cans say they are paying more attention to politics since Donald Trump’s election”). 
 3. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (explaining the importance of Con-
gress’s power to delegate to administrative agencies). 
 4. Agency List, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) 
(listing 449 current administrative agencies) [hereinafter Agency List].  Administrative agencies are 
widely considered the “fourth branch” of government.  See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 582 (1984) (“The 
civil service, largely insulated from politics, may appropriately be regarded as the fourth effective 
branch of government . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2446–47 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describ-
ing the administrative state’s “explosive growth”); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (calling for reconsideration of judicial deference to administrative 
agencies). 
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 Number two: [I]t’s not.  Why not?  Because for the last century, 
and increasing by the decade . . . , more and more legislative authority 
is delegated to the executive branch every year.  Both parties do it.6   
Senator Sasse explained that the United States “badly need[s] to restore the 
proper duties and the balance of power from [its] constitutional system.”7  He 
discussed the rise of the administrative state, noting: 
 Over the course of the last century, but especially since the 1930s 
and then ramping up since the 1960s, a whole lot of the responsibility 
in this body has been kicked to a bunch of alphabet soup bureaucra-
cies.  All the acronyms that people know about their government or 
don’t know about their government are the places where most actual 
policymaking, kind of in a way, lawmaking is happening right now. 
 This is not what Schoolhouse Rock says.  There’s no verse of 
Schoolhouse Rock that says give a whole bunch of power to the al-
phabet soup agencies and let them decide what the governance deci-
sions should be for the people because the people don’t have any way 
to fire the bureaucrats.8 
Acknowledging the rational argument that “Congress can’t manage all 
the nitty-gritty details of everything about modern government” and thus the 
administrative state “tries to give power and control to experts in their fields” 
where congressional knowledge may fall short, Senator Sasse still urged for 
the government “to restore a proper constitutional order with the balance of 
powers. . . .  We need a Congress that writes laws and then stands before the 
 
 6. Senator Ben Sasse, Remarks at Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing (Sept. 4, 2018) (tran-
script available at https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9/sasse-on-kavanaugh-hear-
ing-we-can-and-we-should-do-better-than-this). 
 7. Id.; see also PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PUBLIC, supra note 1, at 23 (finding that a large ma-
jority of Americans—seventy-six percent—say that having a balance of power between government 
branches is “very important”). 
 8. Sasse, supra note 6; see also Lynn Ahrens, Three Ring Government, SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK 
LYRICS, http://www.schoolhouserock.tv/ThreeRing.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) (“Meet the Pres-
ident.  I am here to see that the laws get done.  The ringmaster of the government. . . .  See what they 
do in the Congress.  Passin’ laws and juggling bills, . . . .  The courts take the law[s] and they tame the 
crimes[.]  Balancing the wrongs with your rights.”). 
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people and suffers the consequences.”9  The Senator reiterated that the United 
States needs “an executive branch that has a humble view of its job as enforc-
ing the law, not trying to write laws in the Congress’[s] absence” and “a judi-
ciary that tries to apply written laws to facts in cases that are actually before 
it.”10 
The interplay between the administrative agencies and the Judicial 
Branch has evolved over the years into a relationship with the courts deferring 
to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes and regulations.11  Because 
judicial deference shifts constitutional powers, this doctrine requires closer 
scrutiny, especially given that agency rules often directly impact the public’s 
legal rights and obligations.12  This Note examines the current state of judicial 
deference and suggests its modification to better comport with the Constitu-
tion.  Part II of this Note discusses the background and history of administra-
tive law, focusing on the creation and rise of administrative agencies, and the 
development of judicial deference to those agencies in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. and Auer v. Robbins.13  Part III 
addresses the current state of the law, honing in on Chevron and Auer defer-
ence and the courts’ present application of those doctrines.14  Part IV analyzes 
whether the current application of judicial deference is consistent with both 
the initial policies underlying the doctrine’s creation and the Constitution.15  
Finally, Part V touches on the impact and significance of judicial deference, 
ultimately concluding that courts should modify judicial deference to remain 
faithful to the constitutional separation of powers.16 
 
 9. Sasse, supra note 6; cf. Strauss, supra note 4, at 663 (“Individual agencies almost necessarily 
lack the political accountability and the intellectual and fiscal resources necessary to achieve such 
balancing and coordination.”). 
 10. Sasse, supra note 6. 
 11. See infra Parts II–III. 
 12. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 
of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614–15 (1996) [hereinafter Manning, Constitutional Struc-
ture]. 
 13. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452 (1997).  See infra Part II for discussion of the two seminal judicial deference cases. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
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II. BEGINNINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
The administrative state did not always exist; it has developed and ex-
panded over time with grants of power from Congress and actions of the Ex-
ecutive and Judicial Branches of government.17  The creation and rise of ad-
ministrative agencies, as well as the role of the Judiciary in applying the 
doctrine of judicial deference to agency actions, are fundamental to under-
standing the current state of administrative law.18 
A. Constitutional Structure 
The Constitution provides express grants of authority to each of the three 
branches of government.19  Each act of Congress, for example, must be tied 
back to one of Congress’s powers enumerated in the Constitution.20  The con-
stitutional structure sets forth boundaries that allow for a functional govern-
ment while maintaining the core principles of checks and balances on govern-
mental power.21 
1. Creation of Administrative Agencies 
While administrative agencies derive authority from both the Legislative 
and Executive Branches, Congress creates most agencies.22  Article I of the 
 
 17. Strauss, supra note 4, at 581–86. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.  Article I grants legislative authority to Congress to create and pass 
laws.  Id. art. I, § 1.  Article II vests executive power in the President.  Id. art. II, § 1.  Article III 
provides judicial power to the Supreme Court and the present federal court system.  Id. art. III, § 1. 
 20. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by Congress must 
be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”). 
 21. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1945 (2011) (explaining that the Constitution “not only separates powers, but also blends them 
in many ways in order to ensure that the branches have the means and motives to check one another”) 
[hereinafter Manning, Separation of Powers]; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) 
(“[C]hecks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty.  
The Framers provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate and wholly independent Executive 
Branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the people.  The Framers also provided for a Judi-
cial Branch equally independent . . . .”). 
 22. See generally OFF. OF THE FED. REG., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS ADMIN., U.S. GOVERNMENT 
MANUAL, HISTORY OF AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (2015), https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/GOVMAN-2017-08-02/pdf/GOVMAN-2017-08-02-History-of-Agency-Organizational-
 
[Vol. 47: 143, 2019] Administrative Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
149 
United States Constitution provides Congress the authority “[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”23  
From this clause, Congress has passed “enabling” statutes that create and give 
authority to administrative agencies to implement laws or policies.24  The con-
gressional actions creating the agencies set statutory bounds that limit agency 
actions and scope of authority.25 
In 1877, Congress passed a law establishing the first independent admin-
istrative agency—the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)—with limited 
power to oversee state railroad commissions.26  The objective of the ICC and 
subsequent agencies was to bring greater “expertise, specialization[,] and con-
tinuity” to issues than Congress could.27  Under the direction of President The-
odore Roosevelt and progressive reformers, Congress passed the Hepburn Act 
in 1906, which markedly expanded the ICC’s authority to regulate the rail-
roads.28  During the Progressive Era, the administrative state welcomed agen-
cies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Reserve, Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), Federal Radio Commission, and Federal Power 
 
Changes-104.pdf (providing a history of agency creation and organizational changes).  The term 
“agency” encompasses “cabinet departments, cabinet-level agencies headed by individual administra-
tors responsible to the President, independent regulatory commissions, federal corporations, [and] in-
dependent regulatory commissions within cabinet departments.”  Strauss, supra note 4, at 583–84.  
The key difference between departmental or executive agencies and independent regulatory agencies 
is that independent agencies’ “heads do not serve at the pleasure of the president,” such that the pres-
ident cannot remove independent agency officials without cause.  John O. McGinnis, Presidential 
Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 953–54 (2001).  But see Kirti Datla & Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
769, 775 (2013) (finding that the differences between independent and executive agencies are over-
stated). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 24. AJ Blechner, Administrative Law Research, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR., https://guides.library.har-
vard.edu/administrative?hs=a. (last updated Feb. 27, 2019). 
 25. Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and Partner, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 967, 968–69 (1990). 
 26. Joseph Postell, From Administrative State to Constitutional Government, HERITAGE FOUND. 
1, 7 (Dec. 7, 2012), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/sr116.pdf. 
 27. A Brief History of Administrative Government, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, https://www. 
foreffectivegov.org/node/3461 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 28. Postell, supra note 26, at 8. 
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Commission.29  “These agencies had broad delegations of authority that gave 
them the power to make law, not simply execute it.”30  “The heads of these 
agencies [were] not accountable to the President, . . . exist[ing] as [the] ‘fourth 
branch’ of government not directly accountable to any of the other three 
branches.”31  The administrative state grew even more under President Frank-
lin Roosevelt with the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).32  The Nixon Admin-
istration created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA).33 
 
 29. Id. The FTC “polices against false and deceptive commercial practices and, in conjunction 
with the Department of Justice, oversees the structure of the nation’s industries under the antitrust 
laws.”  Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42 (1986).  The Federal 
Reserve “regulates . . . the banking industry and controls the nation’s money supply.”  Id.  The FDA 
is responsible “for regulating the safety of food, drugs, cosmetics, tobacco, and medical devices.”  
Datla & Revesz, supra note 22, at 817.  The Federal Radio Commission was the predecessor of the 
Federal Communications Commission, which now “controls many aspects of the nation’s telephone, 
radio, and television industries.”  Miller, supra at 42, n.7.  Likewise, the Federal Power Commission 
succeeded many of its responsibilities to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which oversees 
“energy pricing and distribution.”  Id. at 42, n.10. 
 30. Postell, supra note 26, at 8.  For example, the Federal Communications Act of 1934 created 
the Federal Communications Commission and instructed it “to grant broadcast licenses to applicants 
‘if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby.’”  Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 307 
(2000) (originally enacted June 19, 1934) (ch. 652, § 307)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  These independent regulatory commissions were “the hallmark of the New Deal.”  Id. at 
9.  The SEC regulates “the issuance and subsequent resale of securities on national exchanges and 
over-the-counter markets.”  Miller, supra note 29, at 42.  The NLRB “oversees the relationship be-
tween organized labor and management in all but the smallest businesses.”  Id. 
 33. Postell, supra note 26, at 8.  The Nixon Administration created the EPA to address concerns 
about protecting the environment.  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Origins of the EPA, EPA HISTORY, 
https://www.epa.gov/history/origins-epa (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).  The CPSC also formed under 
the Nixon Administration “with a mission to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury or 
death from consumer products through education, safety standards activities, regulation, and enforce-
ment.”  U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Contact / FAQ, ABOUT CPSC, https://www.cpsc. 
gov/About-CPSC/Contact-Information (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).  The NHTSA “carries out pro-
grams relating to the safety performance of motor vehicles and related equipment” and administers 
highway safety programs.  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, FED. REG., 
https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/national-highway-traffic-safety-administration (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
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Currently, the President has fairly broad influence and control over ad-
ministrative decision-making, with “the President’s right to dictate agency ac-
tion through executive orders . . . largely unquestioned in courts.”34  This ex-
pansive delegation of authority to the Executive Branch, and in turn to the 
agencies, is largely due to “[t]he complexities of the modern economy and 
administrative state, along with the heightened role of the United States in 
foreign affairs.”35  As of 2019, 449 administrative agencies in the United 
States promulgated regulations to execute laws created by the Legislative and 
Executive Branches.36 
2. Congress’s Power to Delegate 
The United States Constitution grants Congress all authority to create and 
pass legislation: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”37  Historically, this created a “principle universally recog-
nized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution”: that Congress cannot delegate its legislative 
power to another branch of government.38  However, the Court has interpreted 
 
 34. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 202–03 (2013).  
“Courts have justified this more deferential treatment of presidential political pressure from both con-
stitutional and practical perspectives,” including the need for the President to monitor whether agency 
regulations are consistent with executive policy and the Constitution vesting “the execution of federal 
law solely in the President.”  Id. at 203.  However, the historically unchallenged executive orders may 
not survive with the Trump Administration.  See, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1122–
23 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of President 
Trump’s executive order that restricted entry of foreign nationals from specified countries). 
 35. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 411, 444–45 (2012); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) 
(holding that because of our “increasingly complex society,” Congress needs “an ability to delegate 
power under broad general directives”). 
 36. Agency List, supra note 4. 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 38. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).  Additionally, in his drafted amend-
ments to the Constitution (Bill of Rights), James Madison had originally proposed an amendment 
reading: 
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of the United States, shall be 
exercised as therein appropriated, so that the Legislative shall never exercise the powers 
vested in the Executive or Judicial; nor the Executive the powers vested in the Legislative 
or Judicial; nor the Judicial powers vested in the Legislative or Executive. 
Senate Revisions to House-passed Amendments to the Constitution (draft of Bill of Rights), September 
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the nondelegation doctrine as allowing Congress to give its legislative author-
ity to administrative agencies so long as it lays down an “intelligible princi-
ple” to guide the agencies’ use of that authority.39  Accordingly, the Court 
generally upholds “Congress’[s] ability to delegate power under broad stand-
ards.”40 
Complementing the nondelegation doctrine is the complete delegation 
doctrine: once Congress delegates its legislative powers or authority to the 
Executive Branch via administrative agencies, Congress is restricted from 
continuing any role played in law administration.41  This is to avoid any gross 
expansion of congressional power akin to English Parliament.42  Congress re-
tains virtually none of the policymaking power that it delegates to agencies; 
the courts have severely restricted methods available to Congress for regulat-
ing its delegated authority.43  Although Congress “checks” this delegation by 
passing guidelines for agencies and approving budgets, in INS v. Chadha, the 
Court held that Congress cannot truly “check” the Executive Branch agencies 
because it cannot revoke its delegation of legislative power.44  In that case, the 
 
9, 1789, 3, Bill of Rights, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/bor (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2018).  The Senate struck down this proposed amendment and it did not become part 
of the Constitution.  Id. 
 39. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).  In Mistretta, the Court 
explained that it is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the 
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”  488 U.S. at 372–
73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). 
 40. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373.  In American Power & Light Co., the Court upheld the delegation 
of authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution 
of voting power among security holders.  329 U.S. at 105–06.  Another example is National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, where the Court upheld Congress’s delegation to the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as “public interest, convenience, or necessity” 
require.  319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943).  
 41. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 185 n.6. 
 42. Id. at 185.  For example, the monarchy’s “attempting to influence Parliament by offering its 
members handsomely compensated executive positions” turned into systematic corruption, with joint 
office holding becoming a chief mechanism through which Parliament influenced the executive.  Id. 
at 190–91; see also infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text (discussing the Incompatibility Clause). 
 43. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 185 n.6; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721–27 (1986) 
(holding that Congress can reserve no authority to remove an officer exercising delegated power be-
cause “[a] direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged with the execution of the laws 
beyond [the impeachment power] is inconsistent with separation of powers”). 
 44. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  In Chadha, after an East Indian man’s nonimmigrant student visa ex-
pired, the Immigration and Naturalization Services held a deportation hearing, where an immigration 
judge ordered his deportation be suspended.  Id. at 923–24.  The Attorney General’s recommendation 
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issue concerned the congressional veto provision of § 244(c)(2) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, which allowed either house of Congress to inval-
idate a decision of the Executive Branch made pursuant to the congressional 
delegation of authority.45  The Court held that § 244(c)(2) violated Article I’s 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment by granting Congress a legis-
lative veto over the Attorney General’s discretionary grant of deportation sus-
pension orders.46  Congress could not nullify agency decisions through a uni-
cameral veto; the only way to do this was through bicameralism and 
presentment.47  The Court made clear that “Congress must abide by its dele-
gation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.”48 
B. The Rise of Judicial Deference 
Most agencies have internal dispute resolution mechanisms to adjudicate 
and resolve ensuing complaints related to their decisions.49  The Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) is one of the more prominent vehicles for challeng-
ing federal agency actions in court.50  The APA imposes procedural require-
ments on agencies and permits federal courts to review agency compliance.51  
As with all cases, the availability of judicial review of agency actions depends 
 
for suspension of Chadha’s deportation was transmitted to Congress.  Id. at 924–25.  The House of 
Representatives subsequently passed a resolution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2) opposing 
Chadha’s grant of permanent residence in the United States.  Id. at 927.  Chadha filed a petition for 
review of his subsequent deportation order.  Id. at 928. 
 45. Id. at 923.  The House action pursuant to § 244(c)(2) in Chadha “was not treated as an Article 
I legislative act,” and thus the House did not submit it to the Senate or present it to the President.  Id. 
at 927–28. 
 46. Id. at 952–53; see also Sharpe, supra note 34, at 195 (“The Court framed the issue in the case 
as whether § 244’s legislative veto allowed Congress to legislate in a manner barred by the Constitu-
tion. . . .  [B]y asking whether the unicameral veto was essentially ‘legislation,’ in the sense that it 
‘had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons.’”).  
 47. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55.  Bicameralism means that “no law [can] take effect without the 
concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses,” id. at 948, while presentment 
mandates that “all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law,” id. at 946. 
 48. Id. at 955. 
 49. Strauss, supra note 4, at 585.  For example, the Social Security Administration grants and 
denies individuals disability benefits.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–06, 401–34, 901–14 (2018). 
 50. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2018). 
 51. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 2 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf.  
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on “constitutional, prudential, and statutory considerations.”52  Further, courts 
must have subject matter jurisdiction over the challenged agency action, 
which is not conferred by the APA.53  Federal courts have statutory jurisdic-
tion to hear cases involving questions of federal law,54 meaning those cases 
arising under the APA in addition to nonstatutory (where an agency action is 
ultra vires) and constitutional claims.55  Also, the petitioner or plaintiff must 
have a viable cause of action to challenge the agency action in federal court.56  
A specific statute can explicitly provide a cause of action, or “the APA [can] 
provide[] a general cause of action for individuals aggrieved by a ‘final agency 
action’ if ‘there is no other adequate remedy in a court.’”57  Once an individual 
has completed the agency’s internal review process, a court may review the 
agency’s final action.58 
Traditionally, the Judiciary checks Executive authority because Congress 
cannot do so.59  However, “courts have long recognized considerable weight 
should attach to an agency’s construction of a statutory scheme it adminis-
ters.”60  Since the Supreme Court has held that courts must give deference to 
 
 52. Id. (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (allowing judicial review under the 
APA of only “final” administrative actions). 
 53. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1997). 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); see also Thomas O. Sargentich, 
The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Administrative Cases: Developments, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 201, 
205–07 (1989) (discussing the origins of the federal appellate courts’ exercise of jurisdiction to review 
federal agency actions). 
 55. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Section 1331 is an 
appropriate source of jurisdiction for” three different types of claims: “(1) the APA; (2) a ‘nonstatutory 
action, independent of the APA,’ . . . ; and (3) [constitutional claims].” (internal citation omitted)).  An 
agency action is ultra vires if the action is beyond the scope of its delegated power.  Lars Noah, Inter-
preting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1463, 1470–71 (2000). 
 56. COLE, supra note 51, at 5. 
 57. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018)). 
 58. Id. at 11.  A final agency action is one that represents the “‘consummation’ of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process” and is “one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from 
which ‘legal consequences will flow.’”  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (citations 
omitted). 
 59. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (providing for judicial review 
of executive actions). 
 60. Dudley D. McCalla, Deference (And Related Issues), 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 363, 376 
(2013); see, e.g., Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 571 (1884) (“These authorities justify us in 
adhering to the construction of the law under consideration[,] adopted by the executive department of 
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administrative agency interpretation of regulations and statutes, the courts are 
not truly “checking” this authority.61 
1. Chevron Deference 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to formally solidify judicial def-
erence to administrative agencies in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.62  In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air 
Act to require states that had not achieved the EPA’s national air quality stand-
ards to establish a permit program to regulate “‘new or modified major sta-
tionary sources’ of air pollution.”63  The EPA regulation implementing the 
new requirement allowed states to “adopt a plantwide definition of the term 
‘stationary source.’”64  When parties challenged this provision in Chevron, the 
question before the Court was “whether [the] EPA’s decision to allow States 
to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial group-
ing as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’ is based on a rea-
sonable construction of the statutory term ‘stationary source.’”65 
 
the government, and are conclusive against the contention of [the] appellant . . . .”); United States v. 
Pugh, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 265, 269 (1878) (“[W]e are not inclined to interfere, at this late day, with a rule 
which has been acted [on] by the Court of Claims and the executive for so long a time.”); United States 
v. Moore, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 760, 763 (1877) (“The officers concerned are usually able men, and masters 
of the subject.”); Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827) (“In the construction 
of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon 
to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great 
respect.”).  
 61. See infra text accompanying notes 63–90.  Scholars defending judicial deference do so because 
the interpretation of statutes and regulations presents a question of policy, not a question of law.  I 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3 (3rd ed. 
1994).  “When Congress drafts a statute that does not resolve a policy dispute that later arises under 
the statute, some institution must resolve that dispute.  The institution called upon to perform this task 
is not engaged in statutory interpretation,” but statutory construction.  Id.  “Policy disputes within the 
scope of authority Congress has delegated [to] an agency are to be resolved by agencies rather than by 
courts.”  Id. 
 62. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 63. Id. at 840. 
 64. Id.  Congress left this definition to the states because in amending the Clean Air Act, Congress 
did not define “stationary source.”  John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1522 (2014) [hereinafter Manning, Chevron]. 
 65. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.  The Clean Air Act’s legislative history did not help the Court an-
swer this question.  Id. at 862.  First, during the Carter Administration, the EPA determined that “sta-
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The United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia had set 
aside the EPA regulations because Congress did not explicitly define “station-
ary source” in the amended Act and the legislative history did not squarely 
address the issue.66  The appellate court relied on two precedents that held the 
bubble concept was “inappropriate” in programs for improving air quality.67  
Because the appellate court viewed the program’s purpose as improving air 
quality, it “set aside the regulations embodying the bubble concept as contrary 
to law.”68  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the EPA’s use of the 
bubble concept was “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”69 
Chevron’s two-step analysis sets forth a “basic framework . . . [for] re-
view[ing] agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes.”70  First, courts turn 
to the plain language of the statute to decide whether “Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue”; if so, “that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”71  Second, if Congress is silent or the statute is 
 
tionary source” means any “individual piece of pollution-emitting equipment within a plant.”  Man-
ning, Chevron, supra note 64, at 1522.  However, the EPA changed its position during the Reagan 
Administration, defining “source” as an entire plant.  Id. 
 66. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841.  The legislative history did not “contain any specific comment on 
the ‘bubble concept’ or the question whether a plantwide definition of a stationary source [was] per-
missible under the permit program.”  Id. at 851. 
 67. Id. at 841.  The cases the appellate court referenced were Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 
F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 841 n.6.  Both cases focused on Congress’s purpose for the particular program: Alabama Power 
determined that the bubble concept was “precisely suited” to the congressional design of preserving, 
rather than improving, existing air quality, 636 F.2d at 402, while ASARCO held that the bubble con-
cept was impermissible when congressional intent was to improve, rather than preserve, existing air 
quality, 578 F.2d at 327–29. 
 68. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.  This holding followed the appellate court’s precedent in ASARCO, 
where Congress’s objective was to improve air quality.  578 F.2d at 327–29. 
 69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.  The Supreme Court explained that the appellate court misunder-
stood “its role in reviewing the [challenged] regulations.”  Id.  Once the appellate court determined 
Congress did not have an intent regarding the bubble concept’s application to the permit program, “the 
question before it was not whether in its view the concept is ‘inappropriate’ in the general context of 
a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator’s view that it is appropriate 
in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one.”  Id. 
 70. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 217.  “At its most basic level, the Chevron analysis is equal parts 
statutory interpretation and institutional choice.”  Id.  As a general principle for statutory interpretation, 
“when deciding between two plausible statutory constructions, courts should adopt the construction 
that avoids constitutional problems.”  Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 
2008) (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005)). 
 71. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also Sharpe, supra note 34, at 217. 
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ambiguous, then “the court does not simply impose its own construction on 
the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative inter-
pretation.”72  In that case, courts defer to the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute if “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”73 
The Court adopted this two-step analysis based on the reasoning that Con-
gress “explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, [so] there is an express dele-
gation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute 
by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”74  More-
over, the Court reasoned that Article III judges “are not experts in the field, 
and are not part of either political branch of the Government.”75  “[F]ederal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy 
choices made by those who do.  The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom 
of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views 
of the public interest are not judicial ones . . . .”76  With these explicit policy 
considerations, Chevron created a foundational doctrine for judicial review 
involving an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers.77 
 
 72. Id. at 843. 
 73. Id.; see Sharpe, supra note 34, at 218 (“The institutional choice part of Chevron establishes the 
default rule that agencies, not courts, are the primary interpreters of ambiguous regulatory statutes.”). 
 74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“Chevron’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill 
statutory gaps.”).  Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a court upholds agency ac-
tions if, after reviewing relevant factors, it articulates a rational connection between the facts found 
and the decision rendered.  Sierra Pac. Indus. v. Lyng, 866 F.2d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).  This 
rational basis determination considers whether the agency based its decision “on a consideration of 
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”  Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S 29, 43 (1983)). 
 75. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 76. Id. at 866; see also Sharpe, supra note 34, at 219 (“Congress’s role in managing statutory 
ambiguity under Chevron ends with the enactment of the statute being interpreted: ‘While agencies 
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make . . . policy choices—resolving the competing interests 
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the 
agency charged with the administration of the statute . . . .’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66)). 
 77. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Chevron Defer-
ence” to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 25, § 1 (2005) 
(“Although the Court acknowledged that it had long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, 
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2. Auer Deference 
Several years after Chevron, the Supreme Court decided Auer v. Rob-
bins.78  While Chevron held that agencies may authoritatively resolve ambi-
guities in statutes,79 Auer held that agencies may authoritatively resolve am-
biguities in administrative regulations.80  In Auer, the Court extended 
deference to an agency’s informal interpretation of its own ambiguous regu-
lations as announced for the first time in an amicus brief.81 
In Auer, St. Louis Police Department sergeants and a lieutenant sued the 
St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners for overtime pay they claimed under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.82  The Court considered “whether the 
Secretary of Labor’s ‘salary-basis’ test for determining an employee’s exempt 
status [from overtime pay] reflect[ed] a permissible reading of the statute as 
it applies to public-sector employees” and “whether the Secretary ha[d] rea-
sonably interpreted the salary-basis test to deny an employee salaried status 
(and thus grant him overtime pay) when his compensation may ‘as a practical 
matter’ be adjusted in ways inconsistent with the test.”83  In support of the 
 
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations, in Chevron the Court expressly for-
mulated the principle of deference to an administrative interpretation when the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue.”). 
 78. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  Prior to this case, the Court decided Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., which held that federal courts must defer to the administrative agency’s construction 
of a regulation “unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”  325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945).  Auer deference is sometimes referred to as Seminole Rock deference, but this Note will refer-
ence Auer as the doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretations of its own regulation.  See 
Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of the Seminole Rock Deference 
Doctrine By the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 789 (2014). 
 79. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. 
 80. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461; see also Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The 
Department of Labor’s Policy Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1237 (2013) (“In Auer v. 
Robbins, the Court extended Chevron deference far beyond rulemaking to informal agency interpre-
tations in amicus briefs.” (footnote omitted)). 
 81. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (“Petitioners complain that the Secretary’s interpretation comes to us in 
the form of a legal brief; but that does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of 
deference.”). 
 82. Id. at 454.  The police department claimed that its officers were exempt from overtime pay as 
“bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” employees, while the officers asserted that the 
police department lost the exemption because the personnel manual allowed for pay deductions for 
disciplinary infractions.  Id.  The department had only made one such deduction, and the Court found 
that the “unique circumstances” of that deduction did not defeat the officers’ exemption from overtime 
pay.  Id. at 460, 463–64. 
 83. Id. at 454–55. 
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agency’s position, the Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief with the Court 
setting forth the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the salary-basis test.84  
Affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision that the officers satisfied both the sal-
ary-basis and duties tests,85 the Court deferred to the Secretary “[b]ecause the 
salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s own regulations, [thus] his 
interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly er-
roneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”86  Rejecting the officers’ argu-
ments that the Court should not accord deference to an interpretation stated in 
an amicus brief, the Court held “[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the 
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on 
the matter in question.”87 
“Auer leaves defining the scope of an ambiguous regulation largely to the 
agency that promulgated it.”88  This decision has led to “regulation by ami-
cus,” which is agencies’ use of amicus briefs in strategic, sometimes aggres-
sive ways to advance the Executive agenda in courts.89  The Court’s decision 
in Auer was weighty: while administrative agency rules are not laws, they 
often “give effect to binding statutes, and are themselves considered binding 
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and in reality have the 
binding effect of laws.”90 
 
 84. Id. at 461.  The Department of Labor explained that employers may lose the administrative 
exemption when they make actual pay deductions, but not where there is only an unrealized possibility 
of such deductions.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 456. 
 86. Id. at 461 (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 462; see also Leske, supra note 78, at 813 (“[E]ven agency interpretations set forth in 
legal briefs warrant respect because ‘there is simply no reason to suspect that the interpreta-
tion . . . does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’” (quot-
ing Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 462))). 
 88. Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813, 814 
(2015). 
 89. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 1226–27.  “Auer led to a jubilee of agency amicus activity and 
court confusion [as to] the appropriate level of deference that should be given to agency amicus posi-
tions. . . .”  Id. at 1226. 
 90. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1202–03 (2016).  Section 553 
of the Administrative Procedure Act gives the notice-and-comment rule making procedures for ad-
ministrative agencies.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2017).  Also referred to as “informal rulemaking,” notice-
and-comment rulemaking first requires that “[a] notice of the proposed rulemaking is published in the 
Federal Register.”  Catherine L. Shaw, Administrative Law—Administrative Procedure—Notice and 
Comment Rulemaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 314, 323 (1979).  Then, “interested persons are given an 
opportunity to participate through submission of written or oral comments, and the rule is issued, 
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III. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINE 
The state of judicial deference has largely expanded since Chevron and 
Auer.91  “Broad delegations of substantial governmental power from Congress 
to the Executive Branch—whether of legislative, executive, or adjudicative 
power—have become the norm rather than the exception.”92  Essentially, the 
United States has an expanded Executive state as a result of the demands of a 
complex and well-regulated society.93  This has resulted in “a judicially rein-
forced chasm between the President’s and Congress’s abilities to influence 
administrative [agency] action,”94 as demonstrated by the decisions in Fast v. 
Applebee’s International, Inc.95 and Marsh v. J. Alexander’s, LLC.96 
A. Fast v. Applebee’s International, Inc. 
The Eighth Circuit applied Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of its regulation set forth in a handbook in Fast v. Applebee’s International, 
Inc., where a class of current and former servers and bartenders for Applebee’s 
restaurants sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) “based on Ap-
plebee’s use of the ‘tip credit’ to calculate their wages for purposes of meeting 
the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA.”97  The employees claimed 
 
accompanied by a concise general statement of its basis and purpose.”  Id.  Courts may review rules 
issued pursuant to this process and may set them aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2017).  Courts also defer to 
agency administrative records and other factual findings.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns Inc., 322 
U.S. 111, 114, 130 (1944) (deferring under a federal statute to the agency’s fact-finding determinations 
and applications of law).   
 91. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 92. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 186. 
 93. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven 
by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power [to 
administrative agencies] under broad general directives.”); see also Sharpe, supra note 34, at 186 
(“The President’s power to develop and implement public policy without any Congressional input has 
never been greater.”). 
 94. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 187.   
 95. Fast v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 638 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 96. Marsh v. J. Alexander’s, LLC, 869 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d en banc, 905 F.3d 610 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
 97. Fast, 638 F.3d at 874.  The issue before the court was “how to properly apply the ‘tip credit’ 
to employees” considered “tipped employees” as defined by the FLSA.  Id.  “The FLSA allows em-
ployers to pay a minimum cash wage of $2.13 per hour to employees in a ‘tipped occupation’ as long 
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that Applebee’s required them “to perform nontipproducing duties for signif-
icant portions of their shift while compensating them at the lower” wage rate 
used to compensate tip-earning employees under the FLSA.98  Applebee’s 
countered that the employees were in tip-earning occupations, and such duties 
were incidental to their occupations and thus subject to the tip credit; there-
fore, Applebee’s could pay the lower hourly rate so long as it ultimately made 
up the difference between that rate and federal minimum wage.99  The district 
court found against Applebee’s and “concluded that the Department of Labor 
(DOL)’s interpretation of the FLSA as contained in the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion’s Field Operations Handbook,” which recognizes that an employee may 
hold multiple jobs for the same employer—one generating tips and one not—
and that an employee should earn full minimum wage while performing the 
job not generating tips, “was reasonable, persuasive, and entitled to defer-
ence.”100 
On appeal, Applebee’s argued that the Handbook was “contrary to the 
express language of the statute and regulations.”101  Focusing on the “dual 
 
as the employee’s tips make up the difference” between the hourly cash wage and the federal minimum 
wage.  Id. 
 98. Id. at 875.  Such duties complained of included “wiping down bottles, cleaning blenders, cut-
ting fruit for garnishes, taking inventory, preparing drink mixers, . . . cleaning up after closing 
hours[,] . . . cleaning bathrooms, sweeping, . . . [and] rolling silverware.”  Id. 
 99. Id. (“Applebee’s counters that servers and bartenders are in tipped occupations, so that any 
incidental duties they perform as part of that occupation are subject to the tip credit and can be paid at 
the $2.13 hourly rate, regardless of the amount of time spent performing these duties, as long as each 
employee’s tips make up the difference between $2.13 per hour and the full minimum wage rate.”). 
 100. Id. at 874.   
The DOL’s 1988 Handbook [states] that if a tipped employee spends a substantial amount 
of time (defined as more than [twenty] percent) performing related but nontipped work, 
such as general preparation work or cleaning and maintenance, then the employer may not 
take the tip credit for the amount of time the employee spends performing those duties. 
Id. at 875 (citing Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Field Operations Handbook 
§ 30d00(e) (1988)). 
 101. Id. at 875.  The regulation at issue provides an example of a dual job where “a maintenance 
man in a hotel also serves as a waiter. . . .  He is employed in two occupations, and no tip credit can 
be taken for his hours of employment in his occupation of maintenance man.”  29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e) 
(1967) (amended 2011).  The regulation distinguishes that situation “from that of a waitress who 
spends part of her time cleaning and setting tables, toasting bread, making coffee and occasionally 
washing dishes or glasses.”  Id.  Because the appeal was interlocutory to decide whose interpretation 
of the regulation governed, the court did not decide definitively that the Applebee’s employees had 
qualified for minimum wage without the tip credit.  Fast, 638 F.3d at 881.  The court only determined 
that the twenty percent “threshold used by the DOL in its Handbook is not inconsistent with 
§ 531.56(e) and is a reasonable interpretation of the terms ‘part of [the] time’ and ‘occasionally’ used 
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jobs” portion of the DOL’s regulations, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it 
should accord Auer deference to the DOL’s interpretation of the regulation 
because “the dual jobs test set forth in the regulation is ‘a creature of the 
[DOL’s] own regulations.’”102  At step one of the deference analysis, the court 
determined that the dual jobs regulation was ambiguous because “[b]y using 
the terms ‘part of [the] time’ and ‘occasionally,’ the regulation clearly places 
a temporal limit on the amount of related duties an employee can perform and 
still be considered to be engaged in the tip-producing occupation.”103  Affirm-
ing the district court, the Eighth Circuit noted that deference is appropriate 
where, as here, the agency’s stated position “was consistent with its past 
views”104 and even when that position changes over time, deference is appro-
priate “where there was ‘simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation 
[did] not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in 
question.’”105 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Fast demonstrates a similar judicial def-
erence trend of defaulting to agency interpretations.106  Despite this trend, 
many members of the Judiciary are beginning to push back on the deference 
doctrine, as seen in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Marsh v. J. Alexander’s, 
LLC.107 
B. Marsh v. J. Alexander’s, LLC 
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether courts owe def-
erence to an agency’s (the Department of Labor) interpretation of a particular 
 
in that regulation.”  Id. 
 102. Fast, 638 F.3d at 879 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 878–79. 
 105. Id. at 879 (citing Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for Dupont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 296 n.7 
(2009) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462)).  
 106. See, e.g., Xiao Lu Ma v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 1191, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute was entitled to Chev-
ron deference); Worldcall Interconnect, Inc. v. FCC, 907 F.3d 810, 821–25 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding 
that Auer deference was warranted where the language of the FCC’s regulation was not “clear and 
unambiguous”); Bottoms Farm P’ship v. Perdue, 895 F.3d 1070, 1073–75 (8th Cir. 2018) (according 
substantial deference to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation’s insurance policy interpretation un-
der Chevron). 
 107. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
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regulation (the dual jobs regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e)).108  In Marsh I, the 
Ninth Circuit dealt with the same deference dilemma and regulation facing 
the Eighth Circuit in Fast.109  However, the panel created a circuit split when 
it initially disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Fast.110  Although 
the Ninth Circuit ultimately rectified the circuit split by deferring to the DOL’s 
interpretation of its regulation when rehearing Marsh en banc (Marsh II), the 
underlying dissent reveals the tension within the Judiciary regarding the ap-
plication of deference to agency actions and interpretations.111 
1. Marsh I: Initial Panel Opinion 
Similar to Fast, in Marsh I, former servers and bartenders alleged their 
employers improperly claimed tip credit under the FLSA, resulting in the em-
ployers failing to pay required minimum wage.112  On appeal, the employees 
maintained that the district court erred in failing to defer to the DOL’s inter-
pretation of its dual jobs regulation as found in the DOL’s Handbook.113  As 
a threshold question, the Ninth Circuit panel “determine[d] whether [it] 
owe[d] deference to the DOL’s interpretation of the dual jobs regulation.”114  
Writing for the majority, Judge Ikuta explained that while the court “generally 
 
 108. See generally Marsh v. J. Alexander’s, LLC (Marsh I), 869 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 109. Compare id. at 1112–13, with Fast, 638 F.3d at 878–79 (both determining whether to accord 
deference to the DOL Handbook).  
 110. Marsh I, 869 F.3d at 1124–26. 
 111. See generally Marsh v. J. Alexander’s, LLC (Marsh II), 905 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 112. Marsh I, 869 F.3d at 1112.  The regulation at issue was 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e), which reads: 
(e) Dual jobs.  In some situations an employee is employed in a dual job, as for example, 
where a maintenance man in a hotel also serves as a waiter.  In such a situation the em-
ployee, if he customarily and regularly receives at least $30 a month in tips for his work as 
a waiter, is a tipped employee only with respect to his employment as a waiter.  He is 
employed in two occupations, and no tip credit can be taken for his hours of employment 
in his occupation of maintenance man.  Such a situation is distinguishable from that of a 
waitress who spends part of her time cleaning and setting tables, toasting bread, making 
coffee and occasionally washing dishes or glasses.  It is likewise distinguishable from the 
counterman who also prepares his own short orders or who, as part of a group of counter-
men, takes a turn as a short order cook for the group.  Such related duties in an occupation 
that is a tipped occupation need not by themselves be directed toward producing tips. 
29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e) (1967) (amended 2011). 
 113. Marsh I, 869 F.3d at 1112; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD 
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK § 30d00(f) (2016). 
 114. Marsh I, 869 F.3d at 1116. 
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defer[s] to an agency’s interpretations of its own ambiguous regulations,” the 
court does “not do so when the interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent with the regulation,’ or when such deference would impermissibly 
‘permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting the regulation, to create de 
facto a new regulation.’”115  After considering the statute, the regulation, and 
the DOL’s interpretations in their historical contexts, the court held that be-
cause the DOL Handbook’s interpretation was inconsistent with the regulation 
and attempted to “create de facto a new regulation,” it was therefore not enti-
tled to deference.116  Vacating the district court’s dismissal and remanding to 
allow Marsh to file an amended complaint, the panel held that “no provision 
with the force of law permits the DOL to require employers to engage in time 
tracking and accounting for minutes spent in diverse tasks before claiming a 
tip credit.”117 
In the majority opinion, Judge Ikuta explicitly disagreed with the Eighth 
Circuit’s approach to agency deference in Fast.118  She noted that when the 
Eighth Circuit concluded the DOL’s use of the twenty percent temporal 
threshold was reasonable because the DOL Handbook was not inconsistent 
with the regulation and was a reasonable interpretation of the terms in that 
regulation, Fast did not explain why the Handbook’s threshold was reasona-
ble.119  Moreover, Fast “failed to consider the regulatory scheme as a whole, 
and it therefore missed the threshold question whether it is reasonable to de-
termine that an employee is engaged in a second ‘job’ by time-tracking an 
employee’s discrete tasks, categorizing them, and accounting for minutes 
 
 115. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Christensen v. 
Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)). 
 116. Id. at 1121.  Because the DOL Handbook’s interpretation was set forth in the DOL’s amicus 
brief, and Auer holds that agency interpretations in amicus briefs are entitled judicial deference, the 
Ninth Circuit did not need to consider whether a Field Operations Handbook interpretation itself was 
entitled to Auer deference.  Id. at 1121 n.15; cf. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (“Interpretations such as 
those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and en-
forcement guidelines, all of which lack force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”).  The 
Eighth Circuit also did not address this issue, since the DOL also adopted the 1988 Handbook inter-
pretation in its amicus brief in Fast.  See Fast v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 638 F.3d 872, 877 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
 117. Marsh I, 869 F.3d at 1126, 1127.  Judge Ikuta noted that the panel’s decision would not “pre-
vent the DOL from attempting to promulgate this approach through rulemaking, nor prevent Congress 
from requiring such an approach through legislation.”  Id. at 1126. 
 118. Marsh I, 869 F.3d at 1124. 
 119. Id. 
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spent in various activities.”120  Instead, the Eighth Circuit focused only on a 
few words in the regulation out of context, failing to “grapple with the crucial 
question whether the [Handbook]’s time sheet approach is a reasonable inter-
pretation of ‘job’ (in the regulation) or ‘occupation’ (in the statute).”121  Ad-
ditionally, Judge Ikuta stated that the cases Fast cited for support suggested 
that the Handbook’s approach was unreasonable.122  Finally, “[b]y allowing 
the DOL to impose a substantive [twenty] percent cap on the performance of 
certain duties under the guise of interpreting the word ‘occasionally,’ the 
Eighth Circuit contravened the rule that agencies not be allowed to create new 
substantive regulations through interpretation.”123 
2. Marsh II: En Banc 
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit soon revisited the panel’s decision in 
Marsh I.124  The en banc panel reversed Marsh I, finding that the court should 
give deference to the DOL’s interpretation of the regulation in the Hand-
book.125  At step one of the deference analysis, the court held that the dual jobs 
regulation was ambiguous.126  At step two, the court held that the DOL’s in-
terpretation was “consistent with nearly four decades of interpretive guidance 
and with the statute and the regulation itself.”127  The court rejected the argu-
ment that the Handbook was a new rule promulgated by the DOL, finding 
instead that the regulation was “a reasonable choice within a gap left open by 
Congress.”128  The en banc panel stated, “[b]ecause the dual jobs regulation is 
 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 1125. 
 122. Id. (“These cases hold, consistent with the dual jobs regulation and the Opinion Letters, that in 
order for an employee to be engaged in two different occupations there must be a clear dividing line 
between two different types of duties, such as when one set of duties is performed in a distinct part of 
the workday.” (citing Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., 192 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1999); Pellon v. Bus. 
Representation Int’l, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2007))). 
 123. Id. (citing Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)). 
 124. Marsh II, 905 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 125. Id. at 616. 
 126. Id. at 624. 
 127. Id. at 625. 
 128. Id. at 619, 623 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
866 (1984)).  The court held that the dual jobs regulation that the DOL “promulgated to give effect to 
new statutory provisions addressing tipped employees[] was neither an arbitrary reversal of a prior 
agency position nor ‘manifestly contrary to the statute.’”  Id. at 622 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
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ambiguous and the [Handbook]’s interpretation is both reasonable and con-
sistent with the regulation, we agree with the Eighth Circuit that the [Hand-
book] is entitled to Auer deference.”129 
Judges Ikuta and Callahan dissented, stating, “[b]y deferring to the 
agency, and thus letting it improperly assume legislative authority, the major-
ity fails in its duty to check the agency’s attempt to ‘exploit ambiguous laws 
as license for [its] own prerogative,’” and results in a holding that “raises the 
worst dangers of improper . . . Auer deference.”130  Judge Ikuta explained that 
“rather than interpreting the dual jobs regulation, the DOL Time-Tracking 
Rule effectively replaces the concept of a tipped occupation with a new regu-
latory framework . . . .  [I]t is a completely different approach to the tip 
credit.”131  The rule did “not attempt to explain or derive a general principle 
from” the regulation, and provided “no guidance for interpreting the terms the 
majority identifie[d] as ambiguous in the dual jobs regulation.”132  Judge Ikuta 
also pointed out that “[i]n recent years, a number of Supreme Court justices 
have noted grave concerns about the propriety and constitutionality of defer-
ring to agency interpretations.”133  This dissenting opinion in Marsh II high-
lights the continued internal strain within the Judiciary regarding deference 
 
844). 
 129. Id. at 623.  Because both the 1988 and 2012 versions of the Handbook use the twenty percent 
temporal benchmark, the court found that the Eighth Circuit’s deference to the earlier version in Fast 
was still persuasive.  Id. at 623 n.11.  Additionally, the court held that the “DOL’s interpretation [was] 
consistent with nearly four decades of interpretive guidance and with the statute and the regulation 
itself,” which strongly favored applying Auer deference.  Id. at 625–26. 
 130. Id. at 637–38 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (quoting Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)).  These “dangers” arise because “‘administrative interpre-
tation’ of a regulation ‘becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.’”  Id. at 638, 638 n.1 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 414 (1945)). 
 131. Id. at 641.  “[A] court may not defer to a substantive rule masquerading as an interpretation 
even when the rule is consistent in some way with the regulation.”  Id. at 642; see Mission Grp. Kan., 
Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 781 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[M]ere linguistic consistency between the rule and 
the regulations cannot establish that the former is within the interpretive scope of the latter.”). 
 132. Marsh II, 905 F.3d at 645–47 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 652 (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210–11 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting concerns “about the aggrandizement of the 
power of administrative agencies as a result of the combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to 
agencies by Congress of huge swaths of lawmaking authority, (2) the exploitation by agencies of the 
uncertain boundary between legislative and interpretive rules, and (3) this Court’s cases holding that 
courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations”); id. at 
1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing concern that the “balance between power 
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application.134 
C. Refining Deference 
While Fast and Marsh present examples of current applications of judi-
cial deference to administrative agencies, the courts have refined this doc-
trine—at least theoretically—since its inception in Chevron.135  With Chevron 
standing for the principle of deferring to agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes, and Auer for deferring to agency interpretations of ambiguous agency 
regulations, courts have fine-tuned these seminal cases to limit their applica-
tion and establish distinct considerations for their use.136 
For example, Chevron deference “is warranted only ‘when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
 
and procedure [is] quite different from the one Congress chose when it enacted the APA” and that 
“[b]y supplementing the APA with judge-made doctrines of deference, we have revolutionized the 
import of interpretive rules’ exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking”); id. at 1213 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“This line of precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judi-
cial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Fram-
ers sought to prevent.”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615–16 (2013) (Roberts, J., 
concurring) (expressing the desire to reconsider Auer in an appropriate case); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. 
Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It seems contrary to fundamental prin-
ciples of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”)). 
 134. See Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 983–84 nn.8–11 
(2016) (discussing the instances of doubt surrounding Chevron and Auer deference and possible ac-
tions to eliminate such judicial deference to agencies). 
 135. See discussion infra Section III.C.  It is true that Chevron was not truly the inception of judicial 
deference, but it certainly was a landmark case that has become a founding pillar for the doctrine.  See 
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
512–13 (1989) (discussing the importance of Chevron and the history of judicial deference before the 
landmark decision); Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007) 
(“Chevron did not invent judicial deference, but rather routinized it.”). 
 136. See Leske, supra note 78, at 802–32 (discussing the differences in appellate courts’ applica-
tions of the deference doctrine).  For example, the Supreme Court in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 
expressly foreclosed according Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it does 
not administer, in that case the Arbitration Act.  138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018).  And despite the Court’s 
continued application of agency deference, it has admittedly sent “mixed messages” to the courts.  
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019). 
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promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’”137  If not, then “the interpreta-
tion is ‘entitled to respect’ only to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade.’”138 
As to Auer deference, the Supreme Court in Christensen v. Harris County 
made clear that “deference is warranted only when the language of the regu-
lation is ambiguous” because if the court defers to the interpretation of an 
unambiguous regulation, it would “permit the agency, under the guise of in-
terpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.”139  The Court in 
Christensen held that the agency interpretation must appear in a format carry-
ing the force of law to entitle it to deference: “Interpretations such as those in 
opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do 
not warrant Chevron-style deference.”140 
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. upheld Auer, but limited its application to cases where an agency’s ami-
cus interpretation would not constitute an “unfair surprise” to regulated enti-
ties.141  The Court in Christopher explained that deference is less likely war-
ranted where “an agency’s announcement of its interpretation is preceded by 
a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction” because of the high potential 
for unfair surprise.142  The Court also held that the consistency of an agency’s 
 
 137. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)). 
 138. Id. at 256 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 139. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); accord Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.  For 
example, in Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, the Department of Education passed a 
regulation that permitted an agency to sanction an institution engaging in four specific categories of 
proscribed misrepresentations.  681 F.3d 427, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  When the Department attempted 
to interpret the regulation as authorizing the agency to sanction misrepresentations regarding nonpro-
scribed topics, the court rejected the interpretation as “plainly inconsistent with the terms of the regu-
lation,” thus attempting to create de facto a new regulation.  Id. at 451–52. 
 140. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 141. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156–57 (2012) (quoting Long Island 
Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007)).  The interpretation “must be the agency’s 
‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’ rather than any more ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s 
views.”  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 257–59). 
 142. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 158; see also id. at 158–59 (“It is one thing to expect regulated parties 
to conform their conduct to an agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite 
another to require regulated parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held 
liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding 
and demands deference.”). 
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position—whether “the agency’s interpretation conflicts with a prior interpre-
tation”—is an important consideration because it can indicate whether the 
agency’s interpretation reflects “fair and considered judgment” or “is nothing 
more than a ‘convenient litigating position’ or a ‘post hoc rationaliza-
tio[n].’”143 
Another factor the Court considers in applying Auer deference is whether 
the agency’s regulation merely restates or parrots the statutory language.144  If 
it parrots the statutory language, the agency’s interpretation is actually of the 
statute, not of the regulation, so Chevron would apply instead.145  Finally, 
courts consider the agency’s “expertise in administering technical statutory 
schemes.”146  “[D]eference to administrative agencies is necessary when a 
‘regulation concerns “a complex and highly technical regulatory program” in 
which the identification and classification of relevant “criteria necessarily re-
quire significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in 
policy concerns.”’” 147 
These additional considerations surrounding judicial deference to agen-
cies as set forth in Chevron and Auer have led to some discussion about revis-
iting the doctrine and its application.148  For instance, in a case regarding def-
erence to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of a statute, Justice 
 
 143. Id. at 155 (internal citations omitted).  In a case decided before Auer, but after its predecessor 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), the Court in Good Samaritan Hospital v. 
Shalala found that “the consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that 
position is due.”  508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993); see supra note 78. 
 144. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special authority 
to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, 
it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). 
 145. See id. at 257–59 (applying Chevron where the agency’s regulation merely parroted the lan-
guage of the statute). 
 146. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1222 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).  “Fun-
damentally, the argument about agency expertise is less about the expertise of agencies in interpreting 
language than it is about the wisdom of according agencies broad flexibility to administer statutory 
schemes.”  Id. at 1223. 
 147. Id. at 1222 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)); see also 
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019) (holding that to receive Auer deference, the agency’s 
interpretation must “implicate its substantive expertise”). 
 148. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018) (holding that Chevron deference 
was not required where the statute was unambiguous and resolved the case).  In Pereira, a noncitizen 
native of Brazil petitioned the Board of Immigration Appeals for review of the immigration judge’s 
denial of his application for cancellation of removal and the judge’s subsequent order of removal.  Id. 
at 2112.  The question facing the Court was whether a putative “notice to appear” that fails to designate 
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Kennedy recently noted his “concern with the way in which the Court’s opin-
ion in Chevron . . . has come to be understood and applied,” stating that “it 
seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the 
premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that deci-
sion.”149  Justice Kennedy went on to explain that “[t]he proper rules for in-
terpreting statutes and determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency 
powers should accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and 
the function and province of the Judiciary.”150  Justice Thomas voiced similar 
concerns in his concurrence in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, maintaining 
that because “this [deference] doctrine effects a transfer of the judicial power 
to an executive agency, it raises constitutional concerns.  This line of prece-
dents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check on the other 
branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the 
Framers sought to prevent.”151  With opinions like these bubbling up from the 
Justices, perhaps the Court will reconsider its application of deference to 
agencies again in the foreseeable future.152 
  
 
a specific time or place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings is a “notice to appear” under section 
1229(a) of the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 such that it triggers the 
Act’s stop-time rule ending the noncitizen’s period of continuous presence in the United States.  Id. at 
2112–14. 
 149. Id. at 2120–21 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 150. Id. at 2121.  In the same case, Justice Alito began his dissent by stating, “the Court’s decision 
implicates the status of an important, frequently invoked, once celebrated, and now increasingly ma-
ligned precedent, namely Chevron.”  Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 151. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring).  For more on these constitutional concerns, 
see supra note 133. 
 152. See Leske, supra note 78, at 787 (“But, at long last, a newfound skepticism and willingness to 
reconsider the . . . doctrine is gaining momentum in the U.S. Supreme Court.  In the Court’s 2012–
2013 Term, at least three members of the Court explicitly suggested that they were interested in re-
evaluating this deference regime.”).  More recently, the Court revisited Auer deference in its decision 
in Kisor.  139 S. Ct. at 2408.  All the Justices expressed concern over the doctrine’s misapplication.  
See id. at 2415 (“So we cannot deny that Kisor has a bit of grist for his claim that Auer ‘bestows on 
agencies expansive, unreviewable’ authority.”) (citation omitted).  But the narrow majority opted to 
uphold the doctrine by providing new qualifications and limitations, leaving the concurring Justices 
to describe the doctrine as “maimed and enfeebled—in truth, zombified.”  Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
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IV. ANALYZING DEFERENCE: TIME TO REALIGN WITH  
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The current state of judicial deference to administrative agencies high-
lights two competing interests that are fundamentally seated at the core of the 
U.S. Constitution: judicial deference and judicial review.153 
A. Judicial Deference Checks Judicial Creativity and Usurps  
Judicial Authority 
On one hand, giving deference to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes and their own regulations places a heavy check on the Judiciary and 
judicial creativity, which can be especially prevalent in courts like the Ninth 
Circuit.154  While Chevron “promote[s] fidelity to Congress,” one of the def-
erence doctrine’s primary goals is “to limit judicial power vis-à-vis other con-
stitutional agents.”155  Cases developing judicial deference often refer to the 
agencies’ particular expertise, “their intense familiarity with the history and 
purposes of the legislation at issue, [and] their practical knowledge of what 
will best effectuate those purposes.  In other words, they are more likely than 
the courts to reach the correct result.”156  In support of this justification for 
deference, courts have deferred to agency interpretations of regulations where 
the agency has particular expertise in administering complex and technical 
statutory schemes.157 
 
 153. See infra Sections IV.A–B. 
 154. See Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
2 LANDSLIDE 8, 9–10 (2010) (discussing the 80% reversal rate of the Ninth Circuit).  This assertion is 
based off of the number of cases the Supreme Court has overturned from this jurisdiction.  See id.; see 
also Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2560 (2018) (per curiam) (“The Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
was not just wrong.  It also committed fundamental errors that this Court has repeatedly admonished 
courts to avoid.”); Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per curiam) (“We have before cautioned the 
lower courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—against ‘framing our precedents at such a high level 
of generality.’” (quoting Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 512 (2013))). 
 155. Molot, supra note 135, at 22. 
 156. Scalia, supra note 135, at 514; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron 
Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 310 (1986) (“[T]he agency inevitably enjoys an edge in understanding 
technical concepts and terminology contained in the statute or its legislative history.  The agency is 
also more familiar with the regulated industry.  These advantages of agency expertise are all the more 
evident during an era of burgeoning judicial caseloads, when judges must move rapidly from one area 
of the law to another.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“[B]road deference is 
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Moreover, some scholars suggest that separation of powers requires judi-
cial deference to administrative agencies because the doctrine “returns the 
power to set policy to democratically accountable officials” and “encourages 
Congress to speak with clarity, heightening its responsibility for the choices 
it makes.”158  For statutes that agencies are tasked with implementing, if “Con-
gress leaves an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by text or legislative history, 
the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction,’” then resolving such ambigu-
ity inevitably implicates policy judgment.159  The United States democracy 
leaves policy judgments for the political branches rather than for the courts; 
thus, where Congress leaves an open question of policy, deference mandates 
that agencies rather than the courts answer that question.160 
On the other hand, providing such judicial deference largely usurps judi-
cial power and creates an issue of unchecked executive authority.161  The def-
erence doctrine confers agencies great autonomy and authority to circumvent 
the difficult rulemaking process and instead make laws through the judicial 
processes.162 
 
all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns ‘a complex and highly technical regula-
tory program,’ in which the identification and classification of relevant ‘criteria necessarily require 
significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.’” (quoting 
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991))).  But see Scalia, supra note 135, at 514 
(“If it is, as we have always believed, the constitutional duty of the courts to say what the law is, we 
must search for something beyond relative competence as a basis for ignoring that principle when 
agency action is at issue.”). 
 158. Starr, supra note 156, at 312; see id. at 308 (“For the courts to assume such [supervisory] 
authority on their own would be inconsistent with the status of the judiciary as the only unelected 
branch.  In part because federal judges are not directly accountable to any electorate, I believe they 
have a duty voluntarily to exercise ‘judicial restraint,’ that is, to avoid intrusions not clearly mandated 
by Congress or the Constitution into the processes and decisions of any other branch.”). 
 159. Scalia, supra note 135, at 515. 
 160. Id. (“Under our democratic system, policy judgments are not for the courts but for the political 
branches; Congress having left the policy question open, it must be answered by the Executive.”).  
However, Scalia disagreed with this argument, stating, “the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ 
include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the consideration of policy 
consequences.”  Id. (referencing the Latin expression “‘Ratio est legis anima; mutata legis ratione 
mutatur et lex.’  (‘The reason for the law is its soul; when the reason for the law changes, the law 
changes as well.’)”). 
 161. See Starr, supra note 156, at 292 (“[Chevron] eliminated much of the courts’ authority to in-
validate agency interpretations based on perceived inconsistencies with congressional policies.”). 
 162. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly understand-
able, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power 
and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through the more 
cumbersome rulemaking process.”). 
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“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”163  Because the Constitution confers this duty, “Article III 
judges cannot opt out of exercising their check” on the other branches of gov-
ernment.164  Thus, “to say that those views [of the Executive], if at least rea-
sonable, will ever be binding—that is, seemingly, a striking abdication of ju-
dicial responsibility.”165  This creates the very kind of power imbalance 
against which James Madison warned: “In a government where numerous and 
extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the 
executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and 
watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire.”166 
B. Current Compliance with Underlying Principles and  
the U.S. Constitution 
Judicial deference has evolved since the landmark opinion in Chevron.167  
The current state of the law has developed such that it no longer strictly com-
ports with the original policies and intentions underlying Chevron, Auer, and 
their progeny.168  Chevron explained that judicial deference serves to keep 
judges from legislating from the bench and to ensure that Congress’s legisla-
tive power delegated to agencies stays with those agencies, following legisla-
tive intent as closely as possible.169  The Court arguably endorsed the “‘presi-
dential control model’ of agency accountability,” meaning that “to the extent 
 
 163. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 164. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1221 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 165. Scalia, supra note 135, at 514.  While the note and comment period may act as a preemptive 
“check” on an agency’s proposed regulations, interpretative rules are not subject to any such notice 
and comment requirements.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018). 
 166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 167. See supra Section III.C (discussing the Court’s refinements to the deference doctrine). 
 168. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 626 (“[T]he [Chevron] Court empha-
sized that our constitutional system favors relatively more accountable agencies, and not relatively 
less accountable courts, as repositories of policymaking discretion . . . .”). 
 169. See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (“While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate 
for this political branch of the Government to make . . . policy choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved 
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute . . . .”); see also Scalia, supra note 135, at 
516 (“An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed to either of two 
congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Con-
gress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency.”). 
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that political accountability reduces or prevents agencies from improvidently 
exercising policymaking discretion, the Chevron Court assumed that it would 
be imposed primarily through the President.”170  However, application of ju-
dicial deference after Auer no longer serves the purpose of keeping policy-
making decisions under the purview of officials accountable to an electorate, 
and it appears to give more weight to agency intent rather than congressional 
intent, which undermines the integrity of constitutional separation of pow-
ers.171  Because such important objectives underlie separation of “lawmaking 
from law-exposition,” this doctrine “has potentially troubling implications for 
administrative governance.”172 
Moreover, the current deference doctrine conflicts with the Constitution’s 
Incompatibility Clause: “[N]o Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Of-
fice.”173  This clause prohibits members of Congress from simultaneously 
holding an office in either the Judicial or Executive Branches.174  Alexander 
Hamilton described the Incompatibility Clause as an “important guard[] 
against the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body.”175  While 
members of the House and Senate are not executing the laws that they create, 
the same cannot be said for administrative agencies that both promulgate and 
implement regulations carrying the force of law.176 
 
 170. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 219–20. 
 171. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 654 (“[Auer] adopts a questionable 
approach to the allocation of power in the modern administrative state.  Given the reality that agencies 
engage in ‘lawmaking’ when they exercise rulemaking authority, [Auer] contradicts the constitutional 
premise that lawmaking and law-exposition must be distinct.”).  
 172. Id. 
 173. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 174. See id.; see also Sharpe, supra note 34, at 191 (“[O]ne of [the Incompatibility Clause’s] prac-
tical effects is to prevent legislators from simultaneously creating and enforcing federal law.”).  
 175. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); cf. Bow-
sher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1986) (mentioning the Incompatibility Clause as integral to 
protecting separation of powers). 
 176. See Leske, supra note 78, at 790 (“When a court defers to an administrative agency under 
[Auer], the agency has, in a sense, both made the law, via the promulgation of its regulation, and 
interpreted that ‘law,’ by receiving controlling deference for its interpretation.”); Talk Am., Inc. v. 
Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When Congress enacts an im-
precise statute that it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over 
that implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation).  The legislative and 
executive functions are not combined.  But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves 
to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule’s meaning.”). 
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Even more fundamentally, judicial deference to administrative agencies 
creates discord with constitutional separation of powers.177  The Constitution 
divides the national government’s powers into three categories and vests those 
powers in three distinct branches: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.178  The 
theories of separation of powers and checks and balances existed long before 
the U.S. Constitution, and the Framers emphasized a need for separation of 
powers to protect individual liberty, as well as checks and balances to rein-
force the separation.179  However, “agencies routinely combine all three gov-
ernmental functions in the same body, and even in the same people within that 
body.”180  The agency’s strong presumption of correctness before the courts 
leaves its decisions largely unchecked,181 and the doctrine further “represents 
a transfer of judicial power to the Executive Branch, and it amounts to an 
erosion of the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political 
branches.”182  Under Auer in particular, a court defers to an agency that has 
“both made the law, via the promulgation of its regulation, and interpreted 
that ‘law,’ . . . receiving controlling deference.”183  This power of self-inter-
pretation “contradicts a major premise of our constitutional scheme and of 
contemporary separation of powers case law—that a fusion of lawmaking and 
 
 177. See Talk Am., Inc., 564 U.S. at 68 (“It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation 
of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”). 
 178. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237 
(1994). 
 179. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215–17 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(discussing the theories of John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu and the impact of those theories on 
the founding principles and documents of the United States). 
 180. Lawson, supra note 178, at 1248; see also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (explaining that administrative agencies generally engage in rule-
making, law enforcement, and adjudication). 
 181. Lawson, supra note 178, at 1248–49 (“But the agency decision, even before the bona fide 
Article III tribunal, possesses a very strong presumption of correctness on matters both of fact and of 
law.”).  This violation of separation of powers is something that foundational philosophers warned 
against: “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body 
of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or 
senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”  11 BARON DE 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (A. Cohler, B. Miller & H. Stone trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1989). 
 182. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 183. Leske, supra note 78, at 790. 
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law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties.”184  Because the Con-
stitution delegates power to the courts to interpret law, judicial deference to 
agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes and regulations seems misa-
ligned with the key constitutional principles.185 
Additionally, this power promotes agency inefficiency by “remov[ing] an 
important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the 
agency can say what its own regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is 
plainly erroneous), the agency bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or 
imprecision.”186  Judicial deference appears to create issues for traditional 
rules for promulgating agency regulations under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).187  By adding judicial deference to the APA, courts “have revolu-
tionized the import of interpretive rules’ exemption from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  Agencies may now use these rules not just to advise the public, 
but also to bind them.”188  This is so because “if an interpretive rule gets def-
erence, the people are bound to obey it on pain of sanction . . . .  Interpretative 
rules that command deference do have the force of law.”189  However, this 
diverges from the congressional intent behind the APA: “[A]n agency may 
not use interpretive rules to bind the public by making law, because it remains 
the responsibility of the court to decide whether the law means what the 
agency says it means.”190 
 
 184. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 617. 
 185. See Scalia, supra note 135, at 514 (“If it is, as we have always believed, the constitutional duty 
of the courts to say what the law is, we must search for something beyond relative competence as a 
basis for ignoring that principle when agency action is at issue.”). 
 186. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 655. 
 187. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2018).  Under the APA, 
agencies must comply with several procedures for promulgating regulations, including providing pub-
lic notice and opportunity for comment.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).  Because notice-and-comment rule-
making does not apply to interpretive rules or policy statements, “the agency has an incentive to mis-
characterize a legislative rule as interpretative to circumvent the APA rulemaking procedure.”  Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 555 
(2000).  “In enacting the APA, Congress made a judgment that notions of fairness and informed ad-
ministrative decisionmaking require that agency decisions be made only after affording interested per-
sons notice and an opportunity to comment.”  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979). 
 188. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 189. Id. at 1212. 
 190. Id. at 1211.  The APA states that “the reviewing court shall . . . interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”  5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
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Chevron appears less antagonistic to constitutional principles than 
Auer.191  While Chevron’s principle of deference to agency interpretations of 
ambiguous federal statutes may just provide an additional resource for courts 
to evaluate in statutory interpretation, Auer’s deference to an agency’s inter-
pretation of its own ambiguous regulation is more dangerous to fundamental 
canons of liberty.192  Auer binds the courts and the public to agency interpre-
tations of agency-created regulations, with the only true check being whether 
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable or creates “de facto a new regula-
tion.”193  While Auer presents more pressing concerns, the Court should mod-
ify both Chevron and Auer to better comport with the Constitution.194 
C. Time for a Change? 
Given the inescapable reality that current judicial deference does not com-
port with the Constitution, many scholars have urged the Court to reconsider 
the doctrine.195  In fact, many Justices have expressed interest in revisiting 
 
 191. See discussion infra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.  “[T]he rule of Chevron, if it did 
not comport with the APA, at least was in conformity with the long history of judicial review of ex-
ecutive action, where ‘[s]tatutory ambiguities . . . were left to reasonable resolution by the Executive.’”  
Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
243 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  Justice Scalia noted that he was “unaware of any such history 
justifying deference to agency interpretations of its own regulations.”  Id. 
 192. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because this doctrine [(Auer)] effects 
a transfer of the judicial power to an executive agency, it raises constitutional concerns.  This line of 
precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects 
regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”). 
 193. Id. at 1215 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)); see id. (“This nar-
row limit on the broad deference given the agency interpretations, though sound, could not save a 
doctrine that was constitutionally infirm from the start.”); see also id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“By deferring to interpretive rules, we have allowed agencies to make binding rules unhampered by 
notice-and-comment procedures.”). 
 194. See discussion infra notes 219–24 and accompanying text.  It is also important to note that 
judicial deference and agency regulations have direct and tangible impacts on the average American.  
See, e.g., Marsh v. J. Alexander’s, LLC (Marsh II), 905 F.3d 610, 615–16 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(discussing the impact of the Department of Labor’s regulation on servers and bartenders). 
 195. See, e.g., Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 617 (“[T]he Justices’ new 
doubts about [Auer] are well founded, and that the Court should replace [Auer] with a standard that 
imposes an independent judicial check on the agency’s determination of regulatory meaning.”); Kisor 
v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“A legion of academics, lower court 
judges, and Members of this Court—even Auer’s author—has called on us to abandon Auer.”). 
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judicial deference.196  While on the bench, Justice Scalia pronounced 
“[e]nough is enough,” explaining that it is time for the Court to reconsider 
Auer.197  Additionally, in his final case on the Court, Justice Kennedy stated 
that the Court’s “reflexive deference . . . is troubling.”198  Justice Kennedy 
explained, “[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appro-
priate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have imple-
mented that decision.”199 
As for current members of the Court, in Decker v. Northwest Environ-
mental Defense Center, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[i]t may be appro-
priate to reconsider [Auer] in an appropriate case.”200  Justice Thomas ex-
plained, “[T]he entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises 
serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered in an appropriate 
case.”201  Additionally, Justice Alito stated that he “await[s] a case in which 
the validity of [Auer] may be explored through full briefing and argument,” 
and suggested that he could be persuaded by Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s 
proffered reasons for disagreeing with Auer.202  Justice Gorsuch also seemed 
ready for the Court to take on Chevron,203 and he, along with Justices Thomas, 
Kavanaugh, and Alito, wrote a vigorous concurrence chastising the rest of the 
Court for retaining Auer on the basis of stare decisis.204  Justice Kavanaugh, 
 
 196. See Leske, supra note 78, at 800 (“All told, the Justices’ pronouncements in Decker, as well 
as in Talk America and SmithKline Beecham, unmistakably demonstrate that it is simply a matter of 
time before the Court will accept a case for review with the goal of reevaluating the [Auer] doctrine.”). 
 197. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–17 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68–69 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“For while I have in the past uncritically accepted that rule [Auer], I have become 
increasingly doubtful of its validity. . . .  [It] frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rule-
making, and promotes arbitrary government.”). 
 198. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 199. Id. at 2121; see also id. (“The proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining agency 
jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional separation-of-powers 
principles and the function and province of the Judiciary.”). 
 200. Decker, 568 U.S. at 615 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 201. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 202. Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 203. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.) (“But the fact 
is Chevron . . . permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legis-
lative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems much more than a little difficult to 
square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.  Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”). 
 204. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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too, separately has expressed doubts about Chevron and judicial deference.205 
The remaining four Justices have not expressed such strong opinions 
about Chevron and judicial deference.206  For example, Justice Breyer still 
defends Chevron, yet sees it more as a “rule of thumb” or guideline for statu-
tory interpretation.207  Even so, with many of the Justices firmly expressing 
interest in reconsidering deference to administrative agencies, it seems likely 
that in the near future the Court may grant certiorari to address current judicial 
deference to the expanding administrative state.208 
When the Court does reevaluate judicial deference, it should focus its im-
mediate attention on Auer instead of Chevron.209  Some agencies have as much 
political accountability as judges in the sense that they, too, are comprised of 
unelected officials.210  While those agency positions are not lifetime appoint-
ments, it is important to note that the public does not vote for the person in 
charge of the Federal Communications Commission or the Environmental 
 
 205. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, Judging Statutes by Robert A. 
Katzmann, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2151–54 (2016) (book review) (explaining that “Chevron invites 
an extremely aggressive executive branch philosophy of pushing the legal envelope” and noting that 
“the problem with certain applications of Chevron . . . is that the doctrine is so indeterminate—and 
thus can be antithetical to the neutral, impartial rule of law—because of the initial clarity versus am-
biguity decision.  Here too, we need to consider eliminating that inquiry as the threshold trigger”); see 
also Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Umpires in games at Wrigley Field do 
not defer to the Cubs manager’s in-game interpretation of Wrigley’s ground rules.  So too here.”). 
 206. See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text; see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 
2718 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Judges may interfere only if the Agency’s way of ordering its 
regulatory process in unreasonable—i.e., something Congress would never have allowed.”). 
 207. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I do not mean 
that courts are to treat [Chevron] like a rigid, black-letter rule of law, instructing them always to allow 
agencies leeway to fill every gap in every statutory provision. . . .  Rather, I understand Chevron as a 
rule of thumb, guiding courts in an effort to respect that leeway which Congress intended the agencies 
to have.”). 
 208. For a discussion of whether the Court will take on a case dealing with Chevron, see Valerie C. 
Brannon & Jared P. Cole, Deference and its Discontents: Will the Supreme Court Overrule Chevron?, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. LEGAL SIDEBAR 1, 1–5 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10204.pdf.  
While the Court addressed the viability of Auer in Kisor, Justice Gorsuch highlighted that the majority 
upheld the doctrine based on stare decisis.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2443 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Justice 
Gorsuch assured that Kisor “hardly promises to be this Court’s last word on Auer.”  Id. at 2448. 
 209. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 210. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 675 (“[A]ll agencies are embedded 
in a system of government whose principals (Congress, the President, and the Judiciary) compete for 
influence or control over the results of the administrative process. . . .  [T]he President, who appoints 
agency heads, can freely remove most ‘executive’ officials, and provides political and material support 
to agencies.”).  Often times agency heads are appointed.  Id. at 675 n.304. 
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Protection Agency.211  While the public can vote executives into office who 
may appoint agency officials whose political views align with their own, the 
same is true for judges because the party in power appoints them as well.212 
Deferring to agencies for statutory interpretation seems reasonable be-
cause they may very well be better-suited to help resolve ambiguities in ways 
consistent with current implementations of federal statutes.213  This helps the 
agencies adapt laws as society’s needs and demands change.214  However, de-
ferring to agencies’ interpretations of their own rules is reckless, considering 
the underlying constitutional principles.215  There is no authority in the Con-
stitution that allows such delegation of power to agencies to make, enforce, 
and adjudicate laws.216  Agency interpretations of statutes do not necessarily 
create new legislation; rather, they help fill in policy gaps and give the courts 
somewhere else to consult when interpreting ambiguous statutes.217  However, 
 
 211. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959, 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES 
HANDLING NOMINATIONS 1,  4 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30959.pdf (“Most appointments 
to departments and single-headed agencies are characterized by an indefinite tenure; office holders 
serve at the pleasure of the President.  In contrast, terms of office for appointments to multi-member 
entities, such as commissions and boards, are often for fixed periods of time.”). 
 212. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 213. See Scalia, supra note 135, at 518–19 (“[T]he agency was simply ‘changing the law,’ in light 
of new information or even new social attitudes impressed upon it through the political process—all 
within the limited range of discretion to ‘change the law’ conferred by the governing statute.  Chev-
ron . . . permits recognition of this reality.”). 
 214. See id. at 517 (“[O]ne of [Chevron’s] major advantages from the standpoint of governmental 
theory . . . is to permit needed flexibility, and appropriate political participation, in the administrative 
process.”). 
 215. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Because this doctrine [(Auer)] effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive agency, it raises 
constitutional concerns.  This line of precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check 
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought 
to prevent.”); see also Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person 
who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”). 
 216. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III. 
 217. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (“While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate 
for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).  Arguably, agencies 
would provide a more up-to-date resource than would cumbersome dives into legislative history and 
congressional intent.  See Matthew Robinson, Deferring to Congressional Interpretations of Ambigu-
ous Statutory Provisions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 565, 596 (2013) (“Indeed, the agency is 
better equipped to navigate that area [of ambiguity], depending as it must on political acumen and 
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agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations leave relatively no check on 
such regulations.218  Accordingly, the Court should modify or overturn Auer, 
allowing courts to return to a stricter standard when evaluating such regula-
tions.219 
Without Auer, major judicial deference would boil down to Chevron.220  
To align Chevron best with important separation of powers, the Court should 
modify Chevron and roll back to the deference doctrine introduced in Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., which presents a more sliding-scale type of deference.221  
Under Skidmore, when Congress has not delegated statutory interpretive law-
making authority to an agency, the agency’s interpretation is not controlling, 
 
policy expertise to make its way through the twilight.”); Scalia, supra note 135, at 517 (“And to tell 
the truth, the quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Marsh v. J. Alexander’s LLC (Marsh II), 905 F.3d 610, 637–38 (9th Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“By deferring to the agency, and thus letting it improperly assume legis-
lative authority, the majority fails in its duty to check the agency’s attempt to ‘exploit ambiguous laws 
as license for [its] own prerogative.’” (quoting Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th 
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring))). 
 219. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would therefore restore the balance 
originally struck by the APA with respect to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, not by 
rewriting the Act in order to make up for Auer, but by abandoning Auer and applying the Act as 
written.  The agency is free to interpret its own regulations with or without notice and comment; but 
courts will decide—with no deference to the agency—whether that interpretation is correct.”). 
 220. See Adler, supra note 134, at 983 (“For some three decades, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. has stood at the center of administrative law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 221. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see Jack Beermann et al., Litigation: Time to 
Revisit Chevron Deference?, Comments by Amy Wildermuth in Panel Before 2014 National Lawyers 
Convention (Nov. 13, 2014), in 85 MISS. L.J. 737, 741 (2016) (“[Skidmore is] a sliding scale of def-
erence . . . .  [D]etermined by the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reason-
ing—this is the interpretation—its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it the power to persuade.”); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2447 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Overruling Auer would have taken us directly back to Skidmore, liberating 
courts to decide cases based on their independent judgment and ‘follow [the] agency’s [view] only to 
the extent it is persuasive.’” (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006))).  In Skidmore, 
firemen and elevator operators sought compensation and overtime wages under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act (FLSA) for the time their employer required them to be on-call in case of an alarm, as the 
employer only compensated them for time spent actually responding to an alarm.  323 U.S. at 135–
36.  Holding that such on-call time could constitute compensable working time, the Supreme Court 
stated that the Administrator’s Wage and Hour Division Interpretative Bulletin containing guidance 
for defining worktime deserved deference according to its persuasiveness, adopting a case-by-case test 
for deference.  Id. at 139–40.  Because the district court deferred to the Bulletin as binding legal au-
thority in dismissing the employees’ action, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.  Id. 
at 140. 
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but “is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness.”222  The Court 
in Skidmore held that courts accord these agency interpretations the following 
deference: “The weight [given to an agency’s] judgment in a particular case 
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”223  
Courts should apply Skidmore’s approach to judicial deference in all scenarios 
involving agency interpretations, substituting the prior doctrines of both 
Chevron and Auer with a more balanced, constitutional approach.224 
V. CONCLUSION 
With great power comes great responsibility, the cliché avows.225  In a 
time where “agency rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they once 
 
 222. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001); see Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see 
also Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 681 (“Under [Skidmore], the agency bears 
the burden of persuading the court to exercise its independent judgment in the agency’s favor.”).  In 
Skidmore, “[t]he Court framed the deference question as a principal-agent problem and focused on 
allocating power to whichever entity would be the superior agent of Congress.”  Molot, supra note 
135, at 25. 
 223. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (“The fair measure of deference to 
an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts 
have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and 
to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position . . . .” (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140) (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 224. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 686–90 (proposing that Skidmore 
replace the judicial deference doctrine in Auer).  Manning provides three main reasons to support 
replacing Auer with Skidmore: (1) “Skidmore satisfies the constitutionally-inspired requirement of an 
independent interpretive check” by placing “the burden of persuasion upon the agency”; (2) “Skidmore 
would more generally encourage regulatory clarity by placing a premium on well-explained agency 
accounts of regulatory meaning”; and (3) Skidmore “acknowledges that by virtue of its expertise and 
experience, an agency may have superior insights into regulatory meaning.”  Id. at 687–88.  However, 
for criticism of this proposed approach, see Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
has largely replaced Chevron . . . with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules 
(and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ 
test.  The Court’s new doctrine is neither sound in principle nor sustainable in practice.”); see also 
Molot, supra note 135, at 27 n.74 (“The Court could have further eliminated uncertainty by drawing 
a clearer line between more formal actions like notice and comment rulemaking and formal adjudica-
tion and less formal actions like policy statements and interpretive rules.”). 
 225. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (quoting STAN LEE & STEVE 
DITKO, AMAZING FANTASY NO. 15: SPIDER-MAN 13 (1962)) (“[I]n this world, with great power there 
must also come—great responsibility.”).  
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were, the exception,” it is important to ensure that such power is being used 
responsibly, in a manner consistent with the Constitution.226  While judicial 
deference to administrative agencies under Chevron may still be faithful to 
the constitutional separation of powers, Auer contradicts the constitutional 
structure.227  Given the support from several Justices, the Court should recon-
sider Auer to align the deference doctrine better with constitutional parame-
ters.228 
Each branch of government has a specific role: Congress to legislate, the 
Executive to administer, and the Judiciary to interpret laws.229  But two of 
those branches have decided to delegate and defer their roles to the third 
branch (which ultimately created a fourth branch).230  Congress has abdicated 
its power to legislate, delegating it to the administrative agencies and the Ex-
ecutive Branch.231  The Judiciary has abdicated its responsibility to interpret 
the law, granting this power to administrative agencies.232  While there are 
good reasons for delegation and deference, these doctrines must be exercised 
in accordance with the foundational strictures and structures set forth in the 
Constitution: providing checks and balances on major powers.233 
 
 226. Scalia, supra note 135, at 516.  “[W]e are awash in agency ‘expertise.’”  Id. at 517. 
 227. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 12, at 696 (“Although both Chevron and 
[Auer] speak in terms of agencies, courts, and deference, [Auer] at the end of the day leaves only one 
actor—the agency—to write the relevant regulatory law and then to ‘say what the law is.’”). 
 228. See Leske, supra note 78, at 833 (“Regardless, any meaningful reconsideration of the doctrine 
by the Court would be a positive step in the development of the doctrine . . . .”).  While Auer presents 
more pressing constitutional concerns, the Court should apply the same modified deference framework 
to Chevron cases (agency interpretations of statutes), according deference where Skidmore’s factors 
warrant such application.  See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (setting forth factors for weighing an 
agency’s interpretation).  
 229. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III. 
 230. See infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Sasse, supra note 6 (“[A]t the end of the day, [Congress] punts most of its power to exec-
utive branch agencies . . . because it is a convenient way for legislators . . . to be able to avoid taking 
responsibility for controversial and often unpopular decisions.”). 
 232. See Scalia, supra note 135, at 513–14 (“I suppose it is harmless enough to speak about ‘giving 
deference to the views of the Executive’ concerning the meaning of a statute, just as we speak of 
‘giving deference to the views of the Congress’ concerning the constitutionality of particular legisla-
tion—the mealy-mouthed word ‘deference’ not necessarily meaning anything more than considering 
those views with attentiveness and profound respect, before we reject them.  But to say that those 
views, if at least reasonable, will ever be binding—that is, seemingly, a striking abdication of judicial 
responsibility.”). 
 233. See Sasse, supra note 6 (“The solution is to restore a proper constitutional order with the bal-
ance of powers.  We need Schoolhouse Rock back.  We need a Congress that writes laws and then 
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stands before the people and suffers the consequences and gets to [go] back to our own Mount Vernon, 
if that’s what the electors decide.  We need an executive branch that has a humble view of its job as 
enforcing the law, not trying to write laws in the Congress’ absence.  And, we need a judiciary that 
tries to apply written laws to facts in cases that are actually before it.”). 
 * J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.S. in Political Science, Texas Chris-
tian University; B.A. in Writing and French, Texas Christian University.  Thank you to my family and 
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Pepperdine Law Review for all of their great work and support during the editing process. 
